時(shí)間：2019年12月27日10:00-11:00
地點(diǎn)：主樓429
報(bào)告內(nèi)容摘要:
Existing literature has shown that high degree of product substitutability can drive a duopoly to choose decentralized channel structure (selling products indirectly through an exclusive retailer) in equilibrium. This theory is built on the assumption that each competing manufacturer sells a single product. We examine to what extent this theory still holds when each manufacturer sells two variants of a product category where the market sizes of the two variants may not be equal. We consider two commonly used pricing schemes for branded variants. The first is uniform pricing under which branded variants have the same price. The second is non-uniform pricing under which different variants have different prices. We show that the above theory preserves under uniform pricing. Under non-uniform pricing, however, decentralization can arise as an equilibrium even when one of the branded variants has a low degree of product substitutability as long as the market size of the other variant is relatively large. Thus, a purely decentralized system is more likely to happen with non-uniform pricing than with uniform pricing. We further study the situation with a nonexclusive retailer case. We find that in this case decentralization may arise as an equilibrium when the products are not highly substitutable, as long as the spillover effect is not small.
報(bào)告人簡(jiǎn)介：
李雪，北京外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué)國(guó)際商學(xué)院講師。本科畢業(yè)于北京航空航天大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)偉德國(guó)際1946bv官網(wǎng)管理科學(xué)與工程專業(yè)，博士畢業(yè)于清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)偉德國(guó)際1946bv官網(wǎng)管理科學(xué)與工程專業(yè)。曾于2015年9月至2016年9月赴美國(guó)麻省理工學(xué)院斯隆商學(xué)院進(jìn)行公派留學(xué)訪問(wèn)一年。研究方向?yàn)樾袨檫\(yùn)營(yíng)管理、供應(yīng)鏈管理、運(yùn)營(yíng)與市場(chǎng)營(yíng)銷(xiāo)交叉等。主持1項(xiàng)國(guó)家自然科學(xué)青年基金。
（承辦：管理科學(xué)與物流系、科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
