報(bào)告題目：Two tigers in One Mountain: Are there Implicit Collusions in the Corn Seed Market?
時(shí)間：2023年12月5日，上午10點(diǎn)，中關(guān)村主樓317
報(bào)告人：美國威斯康星大學(xué)麥迪遜分校 施冠明（Guanming Shi）教授
報(bào)告人簡介：施冠明（Guanming Shi），美國威斯康星大學(xué)麥迪遜分校教授，博士生導(dǎo)師，農(nóng)業(yè)和應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟(jì)系主任。本科畢業(yè)于復(fù)旦大學(xué)國際金融系，2005年在UC Berkeley獲得博士學(xué)位，同年加入 University of Wisconsin-Madison歷任助理教授，副教授，教授，并長期擔(dān)任系研究生招生委員會(huì)及研究生項(xiàng)目委員會(huì)主任，以及學(xué)院學(xué)校各類學(xué)術(shù)委員會(huì)成員。她的研究成果發(fā)表于歐美各主要農(nóng)業(yè)和應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)學(xué)術(shù)期刊，如American Journal of Agricultural Economics （AJAE）, Nature Biotechnology, Agricultural Economics等國際知名期刊。她被業(yè)界譽(yù)為其領(lǐng)域內(nèi)“最具潛力年輕教授”， 承擔(dān)多項(xiàng)美國農(nóng)業(yè)部USDA研究課題，并曾擔(dān)任美國自然科學(xué)基金NSF評審，及多家學(xué)術(shù)期刊評審如AJAE, Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, China Economic Review, Ecological Economics等。
報(bào)告內(nèi)容簡介：
In a market dominated by a few leading firms, firms can implicitly divide the market and offer different products from their rivals to avoid direct competition. Such implicit collusion can increase firms’ market power to obtain additional profits. We show the difference in the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of implicit collusion between duopoly and those among oligopoly. Using U.S. corn seed market as a case study, we examine whether there is evidence of implicit collusion in setting prices and/or product lines. Results indicate that there is significant collusion in not only price setting stage, but also product line choosing stage. However, the implicit collusion is not symmetric.
（承辦：應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟(jì)系、科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
